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JUDGING THE JUDGES: THREE OPINIONS
JAMES BOYD WHITE*

For some time I have been working on the problem of judicial
criticism, focusing especially on the question: What is it in the work
of a judge that leads us to admire a judicial opinion with the result
of which we disagree, or to condemn an opinion that "comes out"
the way we would do if we were charged with the responsibility of
decision? 1 The response I have been making is that this kind of
judicial excellence (and its opposite too) lies in the sort of social
and intellectual action in which the opinion engages: in the character
the court defines for itself and for its various audiences; in the
relations it creates with those to whom, and those about whom, it
speaks (including those who have created the texts that it takes as
authoritative); and in the kind of conversational community it thus
establishes, for it is in the conversation by which it works that the
law has its life. The opinion enacts a way of imagining and par
ticipating in the world, and it is in this act of imagination made
real that its deepest meaning lies. One way to put this point is to
borrow from John Dewey's remark that "democracy begins in con
versation," and ask how far the conversation that a particular opin
ion seems to initiate or invite can be said to be one in which
democracy begins and has its life, and how far it makes active po
litical and social principles of a different kind.
This, or something like it, is what I think we mean when we
speak of the law not simply as a regime of rules or as a set of
• Hart Wright Professor of Law, Professor of English Language and Literature, and Adjunct
Professor of Classical Studies, The University of Michigan. This article was presented in somewhat
different form as the Donley Lecture at the West Virginia University College of Law in April 1988.
It is taken from my book Justice as Translation: An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criticism (1990).
Copyright © 1990 The University of Chicago Press.
I. See J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 623-756 (1973), which focuses on the problem of
our critical language; J. WHITE, WHEN WoRDs LosE THEIR MEANING 231-274 (1984), which tries to
work out a way of thinking about judicial opinions, using Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), as its central text; and J. WHITE, JUSTICE ON TRANSLATION
(1990), from which this article is taken.
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choices made by officials, but as a part of our culture which is to
be regarded as the proper object of respect, or even veneration, as
an achievement in its way as worthy of esteem as art and literature.
In this article I continue this general effort by focusing on one
particular aspect of judicial work, namely the way in which the
Supreme Court reads, and should read, those of its own cases that
serve as precedents for its judgment in constitutional cases. For the
question for the Court is normally not simply what the Constitution
means as an abstract matter, as much of our talk about constitutional interpretation seems to assume, but what it should be taken
to mean given its interpretive history, which has an authority of its
own. In addressing this question the Court establishes a relation not
only with the constitutional text but with the discourse, and with
the other texts, by which it is interpreted. What kind of relation
should this be?
To address this question I shall turn to United States v. White,2
not the most famous case in the world but for our purposes of deep
interest, for it provides us with three opinions that define with extraordinary clarity three distinct ways of reading relevant precedent
and in so doing presents us in a fresh way with the question how
prior judicial opinions should be read: how they should be interpreted as single texts, and even more importantly, how a set of
opinions, decided across time, should be interpreted, with particular
attention to the conflicts among them. Sometimes, as here, the question has an especially dramatic focus: When-if ever-should a case
be overruled, or be regarded as having already been overruled, and
upon what authority?
BACKGROUND

The question in United States v. White was whether a certain
kind of police conduct (involving the use of an informer secretly
carrying a transmitter) constituted a "search" calling for constitutional regulation under the fourth amendment.3 This question of
2. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
3. Id.
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course arose not in the abstract but against a background, which
can be sketched in the following terms.
Olmstead v. United States,4 you will remember, held that nontrespassory wiretapping was not a "search" for fourth amendment
purposes. This case was the subject of immediate and continuing
criticism with the result that Congress quickly made wiretapping a
federal crime, in a statute that was later read to require the exclusion
from a criminal trial of any evidence obtained in violation of it. 5
Outside the wiretapping field Olinstead's force diminished until it
was finally overruled by Katz v. United States6 in 1967.
The facts of Katz involved not "wiretapping" but "bugging":
Officers wanting to overhear a particular person's conversations attached an electronic listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth he regularly used, and did so both without a warrant
and without any excuse for failing to obtain one. 7 Formally speaking, the fourth amendment question was the same as that in Olmstead, namely whether this conduct was a "search." 8 If it was, the
evidence obtained by the eavesdrop had to be excluded because the
warrant requirement of the fourth amendment had so obviously been
violated. If not, it would mean that this kind of conduct would be
entirely unregulated by the fourth amendment.
In holding for the defendant, that the intrusion was a "search,"
the Court said that the right question was not whether the telephone
booth was a "constitutionally protected area," as the defendant's
lawyer had urged. 9 "[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places," the opinion said, and went on: "What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection ....

But what he seeks

4. 277 U.S. 438.
5. The Federal Communications Act of 1934 provided that no unauthorized person should
or meaning" of such com"intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence ...
munication to any person. The case holding that this statute required exclusion was Nardone v. United

States, 302 U.S. 379, 381 (1937).
6.
7.
8.
9.

389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected." 10 This opinion was widely heralded
as establishing the fourth amendment
on a new basis, protecting
"privacy" rather than "property." ' 1'
But what is this vague term "privacy" to mean? In his opinion
for the Court, Justice Stewart suggested that the "privacy" of the
fourth amendment extended to anything that the individual sought
to preserve in secret.12 Justice Harlan, in concurrence, said that the
case should be construed to protect only those expectations of privacy that were found by the Court to be "reasonable."' 3 This means
that it is not just the individual's purposes or impressions that count
but the Court's judgment as to whether those expectations should
be protected. Justice Harlan's language has since been taken as the
central holding of Katz; the Court has accordingly faced in a sequence of decisions the question what is, or is not, a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
One such case was United States v. White, 14 the facts of which
were these. Government agents, suspecting the defendant of various
narcotics violations, investigated his activities with the aid of an
undercover informant armed with a radio transmitter. 15 The informant engaged White in several conversations, which were broadcast by the concealed transmitter to agents waiting elsewhere. 6 On
four occasions the conversations took place in the informant's home;
other conversations took place in his car, in a restaurant, and in
the defendant's home. 7 The prosecution did not produce the in-

10. Id. at 351.
11. This notwithstanding the explicit cautionary language of the court: "[Tihe Fourth Amend-

ment cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy.' That amendment protects
individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and
often have nothing to do with privacy at all. Other provisions of the Constitution protect personal
privacy from other forms of governmental invasion. But the protection of the person's general right
to privacy, his right to be let alone by other people is, Eke the protection of his property and of his

very life, left largely to the law of the individual states." Id. at 350-51 (emphasis in original).
12. Id. at 351.
13. Id. at 360.
14. 401 U.S. 745.
15. Id. at 747.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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formant at trial and offered instead the testimony of the agents who
had overheard the conversation through the radio signals. 18 The Court
of Appeals read Katz as forbidding the introduction of the agent's
testimony in the circumstances of this case. 19 The Supreme Court
reversed on two grounds: first, that Katz should not apply to the
events in this case because they took place before that case was
decided: second, that Katz, properly read, would not require the
exclusion of this evidence in any event. 20 I shall be concerned only
with what the Court said about the second question.
JUSTICE WHITE

The majority opinion was written by Justice White. For him this
case was governed by a series of cases, decided before Katz, which
held that when a person confides in another he runs the risk that
this person will, contrary to his expectations, offer this evidence to
the government, either by prior arrangement or on his own present
initiative. 2' Thus when the government arranged with Edward Partin,
an old associate of Jimmy Hoffa's, to engage in certain conversations with him and to report upon them, Partin's testimony about
those conversations was admissible in Hoffa's trial. The Court said
that the fourth amendment affords no protection "to a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his

wrongdoing will not reveal

it.

' ' 22

Since this is not an invasion of a

fourth amendment interest-not a "search"-no warrant is required
before engaging in it. 23 The Court reached a similar result in the
companion case of Lewis v. United States,24 where the government
sent an undercover agent to the defendant's home to make a pur25
chase of narcotics, and in an earlier case, Lopez v. United States,
where an agent carried electronic equipment that recorded the defendant's words.

18. Id.

19. Id.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 754.
Id. at 749.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
Id. at 301.
385 U.S. 206 (1966).
373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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The intermediate appellate court in White conceded all of this
but held that Katz nonetheless required a different result. The court
focused on the early case of On Lee v. United States,26 where the
informer entered the defendant's premises and not only heard the
conversations, as in Hoffa and Lewis, and recorded them, as in
Lopez, but, as in the White case, carried a transmitter that sent the
conversations out to other agents equipped with receivers. In this
court's view Katz, which in its own context of course regarded
"bugging" as a search, implicitly overruled On Lee.27
Justice White disagreed that Katz should be read this way: while
it is true that On Lee was based partly on the grounds that there
was no trespass, a ground that indeed "cannot survive Katz," it
had a "second and independent ground for its decision," namely,
that the defendant had made a decision to trust the agent, and that
the violation of this trust presents no fourth amendment issue,
whether or not electronic transmission is involved. 28 Justice White
sees "no indication in Katz that the Court meant to disturb that
understanding of the fourth amendment or to disturb the result
'29
reached in the On Lee case."
The ultimate reason, for Justice White, is that the fourth amendment does not protect a person against misplacing his confidence
in another.3 0 It does not matter whether the other person testifies
directly, writes down what he has heard and testifies from those
notes, records what he hears on a tape, or broadcasts what he hears
to agents waiting outside. "If the conduct and revelations of an
agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither
does the simultaneous recording of the same conversations made by
the agent or by others from transmissions received from the agent
to whom the agent is talking and whose trustworthiness the defendant necessarily risks. ' 31

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

343 U.S. 747 (1952).
White, 401 U.S. at 747.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id. at 752.
Id. at 751.
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Think of it in terms of expectations, Justice White says: we cannot believe that a suspect "would distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and probable informers with transmitters
on the other." ' 32 If a person thinks he is talking to an undercover
agent, he will not reveal damaging information in either case; if he
does not, he may, and it will not matter to him, from the point of
view of his privacy, whether these conversations are simply remembered or broadcast. The fact that the informer has disappeared and
is unavailable at trial should not affect this result.
This is in its own terms a highly persuasive opinion, and I shall
have more to say about it below. For present purposes I want only
to note that a large part of its force arises from a commitment to
a certain way of reading precedent that is itself not explained or
defended. It works this way. Each case stands for a proposition, or
a set of propositions, which are good law until the moment arrives
at which they are overruled. Thus the cases can be laid out before
the reader like cards on a table, in patterns of significance; the
critical question is which case this one is most like. In this instance
that question is first answered by pointing to On Lee, which on its
facts is very close to this case and would presumably govern it; the
next question is whether Katz overruled On Lee. This is to be determined by asking what the bases of On Lee are: for Justice White
one of the bases is removed, the other untouched, by the rationale
of Katz. It therefore remains good law.
This is almost a caricature of old-fashioned common-law adjudication. The cases all are authoritative, and until overruled equally
so. They stand for propositions: the sole task of the court is to
arrange those propositions in logical patterns of non-contradiction
and to fit the present case within them. All authority is in the past,
in the earlier cases. The function of the Supreme Court, including
in the present opinion, is to produce a series of tags that tell you
how future cases should be decided.
But this is to take an external view of a process to which Justice
White and the reader are in fact internal. He speaks about the Court
32. Id. at 752.
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that overruled Olmstead without any sense of why it did so, with
no sense of the feelings and attitudes that underlay that movement
in the law. According to what he says in this opinion the task of
the Court is simply to declare results: to decide particular cases and
to publish the decisions in forms that can be translated into rules.
The task of the later adjudicator is simply to try to obey these rules
and harmonize them when necessary to keep them in coherent order.
Perhaps one should be lopped or clipped when it does not fit with
the others, but that is all. It is not easy to see how the person Justice
White defines himself as being in this opinion could ever overrule
a precedent; yet that is part of what the Court does, and part of
what it has done in the present series of cases. Virtually the only
value asserted or performed here is the value of logical coherence,
and with it that of legal stability.
If we ask what kind of conversation this opinion establishes, and
with what relation to democracy, we see that there is reasoning here,
and to that extent a sharing of power with the audience, but reasoning of a most limited kind. The sort of argument it invites from
lawyers in future cases is also limited, a parsing of precedent to
produce patterns of consistency, with none of the sense of uncertainty and responsibility that the work of some judges reflects. The
only questions the opinion contemplates are: what the earlier cases
held, upon what principles, and how those principles bear on the
present case. It is true that this is an essential part of lawyering and
the law-and Justice White seems to do it very well-but it is not
all of it.
Suppose you asked of this opinion: What, according to it, is the
purpose of the guarantee of the fourth amendment that individuals
shall be free from unreasonable searches and seizures? Why do we
have a Supreme Court to define and protect these rights? By what
processes of reasoning is the authority of the Supreme Court defined
and established? To these questions this opinion apparently gives no
answer at all.
JUSTICE DOUGLAS

The dissent of Justice Douglas responds directly to what he regards as the hyperlegalistic quality of Justice White's opinion: "The
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issue in this case is clouded and concealed by the very discussion
of it in legalistic terms. ' 33 He then proceeds to talk not like a lawyer
at all but almost like a newspaper reporter, in conclusory terms
about general social phenomena:
What the ancients knew as 'eavesdropping,' we now call 'electronic surveillance'
but to equate the two is to treat man's first gunpowder on the same level as the
nuclear bomb. Electronic surveillance is the greatest leveler of human privacy ever

known. How most forms of it can be held 'reasonable' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment is a mystery.m

This is the voice not of a lawyer, but of a citizen or as I say perhaps
a journalist, and it is a central part of Douglas' point to speak that
way: his object is to resist White's legal talk by insisting on the
presence of a voice of another, more ordinary, kind.
Not that he is without "precedents" of his own. He quotes, for
example, a message by Franklin Roosevelt, dated May 21, 1940,
which, while authorizing wiretapping in the cases of spies and sabotage, went on to say that under ordinary circumstances "wiretapping by government agents should not be carried on for the excellent
'35
reason that it is almost bound to lead to abuse of civil rights.
And he invokes modern books on privacy, too: "Today no one
perhaps notices that because only a small, obscure criminal is the
victim. But every person is the victim, for the technology we exalt
today is every man's master. Any doubters should read Arthur R.
Miller's The Assault On Privacy (1971)."36 He closes this section of
his opinion by citing an article in The Progressive magazine, all in
37
a kind of parody of the case-bound reasoning of Justice White.
We have here the assertion or display of a mentality that is as
far from Justice White's as could well be imagined. Justice Douglas
focuses upon the social phenomena of "surveillance," not the legal
text-not the constitutional text, not the cases explicating it-and
he opposes surveillance of any kind, on any grounds, without both33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 756.
at 756-57.
at 757.
at 758.
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ering to discriminate between one kind and the other. In particular
he fails even to allude to the distinction that for Justice White is
crucial, between the case in which the government intrudes upon a
conversation which both parties wish private and the case in which
one of the parties is himself an agent or wishes to disclose what is
said to the government. This, added to his use of mock precedents,
can be read as a kind of serious teasing of Justice White, the solemn
and rigid lawyer who is bound by his sense of logic and nothing
else.
In the second half of his opinion Justice Douglas does turn to
the law, but in a very different way indeed from Justice White. For
Douglas the precedents represent not static and equal authorities,
like cards on a table, but a progressive movement in time, from less
enlightened to more enlightened positions. He focuses especially on
Berger v. New York, 38 which invalidated a comprehensive New York
wiretapping statute on fourth amendment grounds, and Katz, which
held that nonconsensual bugging was a "search" subject to fourth
amendment regulation, and regards them as holding simply that all
forms of electronic surveillance "are now covered by the Fourth
Amendment. ' 39 But once more he fails to make the fundamental
distinction that is essential to the majority opinion in White, between
surveillance that is consented to by one of the parties and surveillance that is not. It would flunk a law school exam.
Surely Justice Douglas, one of the smartest people ever to sit
on the Supreme Court, knew this. Why then does he insist on talking
this way? Simply to frustrate the lawyer-judge for whom such distinctions are the stuff of life? To express disdain for all reasoning
of that kind in favor of the plain assertions of plain rights? Here
Douglas is in fact working rather like the authoritarian Taft in Olmstead, for like him he seeks to shortcut the processes of legal thought
by the use of common-sense language and ordinary talk. 40 There is
much to be said for the use of the vernacular in law, but to speak
38. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
39. White, 401 U.S. at 758.

40. For further discussion of Taft's opinion, see J.Wrme, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATIoN, ch. 6
(1990).
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only in such terms, at least in such a conclusory way as Douglas
and Taft do, is to eliminate the processes of law altogether.
When he turns to prior law, Douglas divides the cases into two
classes, those that come after Berger and those that precede it. 41 He
discounts all the decisions decided before Berger as representing an
"opposed view." ' 42 Thus for him On Lee is really based upon "[t]he
idea, discredited by Katz, that there was no violation of the Fourth
Amendment because there was no trespass." 43 Lopez, where the government agent carried a pocket wire recorder, "was also pre-Berger
and pre-Katz." 44 He says: "We have moved far away from the rationale of On Lee and Lopez and only a retrogressive step of large
dimensions would bring us back to it."' 4 He lives in a world of
moral progress, in which the old is outmoded because it is unenlightened. Unlike Justice White, for whom all precedent is of equal
authority, Justice Douglas creates a scale of authority, crediting one
group of cases, discrediting others, according to the era they represent.
It would be easy to mock this opinion, but it is important to
see that Douglas in fact focuses on a real element that White leaves
out, namely, the way in which the law changes and the reasons for
which it does so. Justice Douglas' statement of those reasons is
crude-"for" or "against" electronic surveillance and wiretappingand his attributions of motives to the Court is equally simplistic,
for in his view the Justices seem to be either high-minded protectors
of civil rights or craven apologists for a tyrannical government. But
he does see something that Justice White misses, and something
central to the law. It is thus fair to say that each of these opinions
has real merits as well as real defects: neither is adequate but they
expose each other's deficiencies rather well.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 759.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.at 761.
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JUSTICE HARLAN

Justice Harlan, normally a "conservative" who resisted the
transformation of the law of criminal procedure worked by the Warren Court, here writes in dissent. Usually he and Douglas were deep
antagonists; here in one sense-their "results'"-they are on the same
side, but in another-their sense of the law and the Court-they
remain divided.
Justice Harlan begins by defining the question, much as Justice
White did, in terms of the binding force of precedent: "The uncontested facts of this case squarely challenge the continuing viability
of On Lee v. United States." 46 But for Justice Harlan this is not
merely a technical question about the holding of a prior case, as it
is for Justice White, but an important social and political question;
the prior case is accordingly to be read not as simply a declaration
of a rule but as an attempt to find a meaningful resolution of an
issue difficult on the merits, a matter that has "provoked sharp
differences of opinion both within and without the judiciary. ' 47
"[T]he factors that must be reckoned with in reaching constitutional
conclusions ...

are exceedingly subtle and complex. ' 48 This is all

a way of saying that this is a large and serious question, not to be
reduced to a merely technical or easy one.
His next move is to reexamine the sequence of cases. This section
of the opinion is a lesson in the reading of precedent, directed both
to Justice White and to Justice Douglas, as well as to those who
might be persuaded by them. First, as to On Lee itself, upon which
the majority relies so strongly: This was a five-four judgment, Harlan reminds us, based solidly on the trespass rationale that Katz was
later to overrule and which in fact three members of the Court
disapproved of at the time. 49 It is true "that the opinion in On Lee
drew some support from a brief additional assertion that 'eavesdropping on a conversation, with the connivance of one of the parties' raises no Fourth Amendment problem. But surely it is a
46. Id. at 768.
47. Id. at 771.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 774.
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misreading of that opinion to view this unelaborated assertion as a
wholly independent ground for decision." 50 This "misreading" is of
course essential to Justice White's opinion; Justice Harlan's remark
thus challenges the central link in Justice White's chain of authority
and challenges as well his methodological commitments to a reading
of prior cases as propounding with equal weight a series of equally
valid propositions.
Eleven years later the Court decided Lopez v. United States,"
the tape recording case. Lopez is cited by White as reaffirming On
Lee, but Harlan, who was in fact the author of the majority opinion
there, says it can hardly be thought to have done so. 5 2 While the
Court did not then take the step of overruling Olmstead, he says,
it was careful to base its judgment on two premises: the fact that
the tape recordings were used oniy to corroborate the evidence of
the government informer and the fact that there was no risk here
not fairly assumed by the defendant. "To the discerning lawyer"
unlike Justice White, Harlan is necessarily implying "Lopez could
53
give only pause, not comfort."
Harlan next turns to Osborn v. United States,5 4 a companion to
the Hoffa and Lewis cases, but to which White made no reference
at all. In Osborn agents investigating the attempted subornation
of a juror were equipped with tape recording devices, the contents
of which were sought to be used in evidence against the defendants. 6
In this it was like Lopez and similar to On Lee and White. But
there was a dramatic difference as well, for here the police sought
and obtained judicial authorization for what they did.57 They had,
that is, a form of the judicial "warrant" normally required by the

50. Id.
51. 373 U.S. 447.
52. White, 401 U.S. at 777.
53. Id. at 776.
54. 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
55. Why did Justice Douglas make no reference to this case, except in a footnote? I think the
reason is that he had dissented in Osborn, believing that even under those circumstances the evidence
should be excluded, and did not want to refer to the case approvingly.
56. Osborn, 385 U.S. 323.
57. Id. at 328.
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fourth amendment for any intrusion that amounts to a "search."" 8
The Supreme Court opinion upholding the police conduct in Osborn
praised the government in the warmest terms and approved most
strongly of what it had done.59 While this did not entail an explicit
holding that there was a "search"-for the government had done
what was required of them if there were-some sense that the fourth
amendment spoke to this situation was certainly implicit in the
Court's pleased approval.w
Justice Harlan thus challenges Justice White in two related ways.
First, he rejects the implicit theory that cases are to be read simply
as rules to be followed until overruled. Rather they are complex
struggles to come to terms with real difficulty, to be read in light
of the Court's perception of that difficulty and to be given weight
reflecting both the Court's confidence in its judgment at the time
and our own present sense of its wisdom. Second, he insists that
one take all the judicial evidence into account, which Justice White
cannot do, for his reading cannot explain the enthusiasm with which
the Court approved of the result in Osborn. It can of course explain
the narrow holding, for his theory would also have led to affirmance. But to reduce a case to its result in that way is to destroy its
character as a communicative act, as an expression of mind to mind.
Justice Harlan, then, sees the law as developing, as Justice White
did not, but developing in a complex and reasoned way, not in the
simple fashion that Justice Douglas describes. For him, indeed, the
ultimate overruling of Olmstead by Katz was deeply foreshadowed
by other developments:
Viewed in perspective, then, Katz added no new dimension to the law. At most

it was a formal dispatch of Olmstead and the notion that such problems may
usefully be resolved in the light of the trespass doctrine, and, of course, it freed
for speculation what was already evident, that On Lee was completely open to

question.61

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. White, 401 U.S. at 777.
61. Id. at 780. For an elaboration of the view that Katz added "no new dimension to the law,"
and should therefore be retroactive in its application, see Justice Harlan's opinion in Desist v. United
States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969).
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So far all of Justice Harlan's reading of precedent has merely
established this last point, that On Lee is open to question. 62 How
is the matter of its continued force to be decided? This is a version
of the central question that faces every judge examining any case
that bears upon the one before her: Is this a case to which she should
submit her own judgment, or is it properly to be regarded as no
longer having effect? How is this decision to be made: by the strength
of one's own agreement or disagreement with the case? Or by something external to the self, in the law, and if so, what?
Justice Harlan makes no claim that he is entitled to oppose his
will or preference to that of a prior court. But as a reader of the
legal context in which he acts, as an interpreter of the cases which
define it, he attempts to find an authority outside the self-though
in part established by his skill and understanding-upon which to
rest. He reads the decisions of the Court since On Lee and finds
in them "sound general principles for the application of the Fourth
Amendment" of a kind that were either "dimly perceived or not
fully worked out" at the time of On Lee itself, and which, therefore,
have a higher standing than the holding of that case. 6 These principles, Harlan says, include the following: "ITihat verbal communications are protected by the Fourth Amendment, that the
reasonableness of a search does not depend on the presence or absence of a trespass, and that the Fourth Amendment is principally
concerned with protecting interests of privacy, rather than property
rights." 64
How do these principles bear upon the Lewis and Hoffa cases?
Do they suggest, for example, that a warrant should be required
whenever anyone acts as an undercover agent? Justice Harlan says
no, asserting as a crucial difference that "[iun each of these cases
the risk the general populace faced was different from that surfaced
by the instant case. No surreptitious third ear was present, and in
each opinion that fact was carefully noted." 65 It will not do, as
62. White, 401 U.S. at 780.
63. Id. at 780-81.
64. Id. at 781.

65. Id. at 784.
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Justice White will have it, simply to assert that there is "no difference" between a case in which an individual talks to a government
informer and the case in which that conversation is recorded or
transmitted. 66 While the "risk analysis" approach represents "an
advance over the unsophisticated trespass analysis of the common
law," it too has its "limitations and can, ultimately, lead to the
substitution of words for analysis." 67 In particular, Harlan says, we
must "transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumptions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we
assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules
the customs and values of the past and the present." 6
The real question, then, is whether the risk that is imposed on
the public by the use of such bugging devices is a proper one under
the fourth amendment. This question should be answered, he says,
"by assessing the nature of a particular practice and the likely extent
of its impact on the individual's sense of security balanced against
the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement." 69
The issue for Justice Harlan, then, is not what risks wrongdoers
must have to contemplate, but what risks every person in the country
must have to contemplate. 70 If the use of electronic surveillance of
this kind is not regulated by the fourth amendment, it means that
the police may do it to any person at any time, without any controls
whatsoever.
The interest On Lee fails to protect is the expectation of the ordinary citizen,
who has never engaged in illegal conduct in his life, that he may carry on his
private discourse freely, openly, and spontaneously without measuring his every

word against the connotations it might carry when instantaneously heard by others
unknown to him and unfamiliar with his situation or analyzed in a cold, formal
record played days, months, or years after the conversation.'

Interposition of a warrant requirement is designed not to shield
"wrongdoers" but to secure a measure of privacy and a sense of
personal security throughout our society. 72
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

72. Id.

at 750.
at 786.
at 787.
at 790.
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At the end, then, Harlan must choose, and choose upon the basis
of his own construction of the fourth amendment, of the values it
protects, and of the social effects of the practice of consensual bugging. But this act of choice is not the raw exercise of power, or the
imposition of his values on the law, or the simple assertion of a
"cost-benefit" method of reasoning, for it takes place in the context
created by the rest of his opinion, in which he defines himself as
faithful to the law, as a responsible and intelligent reader of the
cases that give it meaning-far better than the literalist White or
the simplistic Douglas-and as one whose values, and hence whose
choice, are inspired in large measure by the law to which he is paying
such careful attention. When he makes his choice it is to fill a gap
left by the law, a gap that requires a choice; and he grounds his
choice in an educative process-in which his reader may share by which it is not he alone, as an atomized bearer of tastes and
preferences, who acts, but he as one who is formed by the very
tradition to which he contributes in this opinion. When this case is
read in the context of his work as a whole-in which he repeatedly
argues for judicial restraint, on the grounds that the residual power
of the Court should be reserved for great matters on which the
tradition is inconclusive-we can see it as the fulfillment of an implied promise, that when such a case arose he would act, and here
he did.
When we put these opinions together with those in Olmstead,
certain parallels emerge. Justice White's opinion, like Taft's, purports to locate all authority in texts external to itself, in the authoritative declarations of others. For Taft this declaration was the
language of the fourth amendment, to him "plain" beyond question;
for White, the external declaration consists of the series of cases
construing that amendment. His texts are more complex than Taft's,
and harder to read-they require an understanding of the reasons
why the cases were decided as they were and the construction of
the distinctions that organize them-but for White as for Taft there
is nothing in principle problematic about the process of reading them,
at least for the legally trained mind. (But this is an important qualification: the authority he rests upon is not just the text plus "com-
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mon sense," as with Taft: it is the text plus a certain form of
disciplined reading.)
Justice Douglas finds his authority not in the specific language
of the Constitution-one remembers his famous opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut,73 outlawing state-imposed contraceptive bans upon
married couples, in which he spoke of the "penumbras" of the
various amendments-nor in the specific holdings of prior cases,
but in the providential history of which he is an observer and in
which he is an actor. Once we thought this, but we were wrong:
gradually we have come to see the truth. This movement is its own
authority, at least as it is reported by a mind correctly attuned to
it. To compare for a moment legal with biblical interpretation, one
is reminded of those Protestants-among whom Douglas was in fact
raised-who focused like all Protestants upon the sacred text rather
than the tradition, but who read the text with an eye not to its letter
but to its spirit. 74 This is a kind of reading that is easy to mockone thinks of the famous pages in Hooker and Swift where this is
done-but for us perhaps too easy. There is much to the view that
what is required to read a text is not mere "reason," as if that
could be segmented off from the rest of experience and the self,
but attunement, or right orientation; the effort to make oneself its
ideal reader.
Harlan sees authority not simply in the cases, certainly not in
the spirit of change, but in the tradition out of which he speaks;
this tradition must be read, and we are responsible for the way we
choose to read it, and hence to construct it. The right way of reading
is not legalistic, as White's is, but as a "discerning lawyer," that
is, with a kind of thoughtfulness and attention that go beyond the
local holdings to what Harlan calls the "principles" that the cases
can be seen gradually to create. Authority thus lies in a kind of
respectful interaction between mind and material, past and present,
in which each has its proper contribution to make: not simply in
the tradition, then, but in the tradition as it is reconstituted in the
73. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

74. For a discussion of "Protestant" and "Catholic" hermeneutics see S.LEVINSON, CON SrxTtnoNAL FArr, (1988).
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present text. The central excellence of the judicial mind lies in the
art of composition by which this is achieved.
With his reader Justice Harlan establishes a double relation: in
one sense he educates us-he trains us in the art of "discerning,"
of seeing through the holdings to the deeper patterns-but at the
same time he holds up his own efforts of that kind to our own
scrutiny and criticism, thus establishing a kind of fundamental
equality with us too. In this sense the conversation he establishes,
despite its traditional cast, is deeply democratic.
The past is there and he treats it seriously, as Douglas does not;
but he knows, as White in this opinion seems not to have known,
that it is impossible simply to set over the meaning of this past,
without gain or loss or modification, into a series of declaratory
propositions. Like Brandeis in Olmstead, he sees that the past must
be translated and that this necessarily involves making it mean something new, something it does not already mean. The present mind
creates out of the materials of the past the meanings upon which
its own authority rests; but in doing so it always acts under an
obligation of fidelity to what is external to the present self, the
present moment.
In all of this there are many paradoxes and ironies. It is, for
example, Brandeis's famous opinion in Olmstead, in many ways so
admirable, that provides the ground used in Katz to overrule that
case; but the opinion in Katz has some of the conclusory and authoritarian characteristics of Taft's opinion, in many ways so objectionable. And the fourth amendment is here converted from a
text regulating "search and seizure" into a "right of privacy against
the government," leaving us with the kind of question the due process clause itself presents, how such vague language is to be given
meaning, but without the history that might help us do this. Does
Katz mean that judges will have to become simply authoritative sensibilities? Or can the processes of legal thought still find a way to
work?
White provides three responses to this question, of which the
first, that of Justice White, can perhaps be explained by this history.
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He insists upon reading the prior constitutional cases as a set of
authoritative holdings, in a rigid adherence to a very old-fashioned
model of a common-law thought. This method can easily be criticized, as I have done, but in fairness one should also say that this
choice may be self-consciously motivated by Justice White's sense
of the current state of constitutional law, and in particular the law
of the fourth amendment, namely, that we are in danger of losing
all sense of obligation to the past. After all, White was decided at
the end of the Warren Court era, when, in a burst of judicial energy,
case after case had been overruled; the style of White's opinion here
can be thus taken as an argument by performance that the Court
should look at prior cases as constraining it far more than it had
come to do. This caricatured form of thought, that is, can itself be
read as a kind of corrective argument about the way we ought to
think.
Much can also be said in defense of Douglas's opinion, which
at once mocks White's and introduces important ways of thinking
which that opinion excludes. The deep question Douglas brings to
the surface is the proper role of stare decisis, the doctrine that gives
opinions their authority. White pretends to see no problem of this
sort, and seems simply to regard all opinions as of equal weight.
But to do this he must treat the opinions in a rather reduced way,
as each promulgating a rule or a set of rules resting on wholly
restatable reasons rather than seeing them as parts of a process in
self-education and self-constitution. Equally important, his method
has no place for the kind of change this sort of law requires, namely,
by overruling.
Our reading of Douglas's opinion thus suggests the general question: What kind of respect should be paid to the opinions of the
past and why? One might think, for example, that the only text
that matters is the Constitution (or, in a statutory case, the statute).
Whatever other judges have said is only their opinion, to be given
no more weight than their reasons seem to us to warrant. On this
view all real authority would reside in the primary text; the opinion
of the court would be entitled to no more consideration than an
academic or even journalistic commentary. (This is roughly the way
in which civil-law systems treat statutory adjudication.) This is a
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difficult position for our Supreme Court in practice to accept, for
it would change our whole sense of what the Court does. Our Justices
do not feel that they are just commentators but that they are acting
as lawmakers; they no doubt want their own opinions to receive the
kind of attention that law commands, and we do too. For that to
happen they must accord other opinions equal respect, or their own
claims to authority will be undermined.
But the question can be put more generally, whether the Court
should seek to have its decisions regarded as law in the first place.
What would be lost if they were not? How are judicial decisions
different, for example, from the opinions of commentators? The
difference lies not in the intelligence or virtue of judges as people
but in the process and discipline by which they act. Their decisions
are not abstract but contextualized in the demands of a particular
case; they are not volunteered, but required of them, for they do
not choose what comes before them; and they are informed by argument both ways, both oral and written, and by argument that is
itself informed and constrained by what has preceded it. The array
of decisions a court makes over time in this way constitutes an
enormous reservoir of intellectual and practical experience upon which
future lawyers and judges may draw. In this sense the heart of the
law is that it is a mode of communal self-education and self-constitution. This process can work as it does only if the cases we read
are entitled to attention of a very high degree of intensity. This is
indeed a function of their authority as law.
There are those who would argue with this view, wishing to reduce law to mere policy and to act as though our freedom to choose
at any point were wholly unconstrained except by the nature of our
material and social resources. But it is the nature of the law to
constitute a set of constraints; its art lies in living with and within
them.
All this is not to say that all cases should be given equal weight.
This is the point that Douglas sees and that White's opinion slides
over. How are we to decide which cases are no longer "good law"?
How are we to talk about the process by which we do so? But
Douglas is less helpful than he might be, speaking as he does in
terms of self-evident moral progress. Here Harlan's achievement is
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remarkable, for in his opinion he re-creates the past in such a way
as to pay it the respect it is due, and this in two seemingly conflicting
ways: he respects both the particular conclusions the cases have
reached and the process of transformation by which certain of these
cases lose their authority as law. For in his view the proper overruling of a case is not a simple act of will or judgment, a decision
to overturn, but a gradual process by which the understandings that
underlie the case are eroded or modified, over time, and by others
as well as oneself. The law is a community in the process of its own
transformation, and for him the transformation is entitled to the
same kind of weight that the particular decisions have. The transformation that counts as authority is not to be found in one's preferences but in the world. It is not the judge's will that decides but
his sense of the meaning of the authoritative past. And what changes
can include his own mind: Justice Harlan here reaches a judgment
that would require a different result in Lopez, the opinion of which
he was the author.
Each of these styles of thought constitutes a different relation
not only with the cases of the past, but with the present reader and
with those who will think about these matters in the future as well.
Justice White's opinion exposes itself to factual and logical refutation, and to that extent creates with its reader the relation that
exists between reasoning beings, and this is to perform an essential
but limited egalitarianism; limited because the intellectual processes
are limited, and because they assume the kind of knowledge that
belongs only to a learned profession. Douglas's opinion is egalitarian
in a different sense: it speaks to and for the nonlawyer in the world
and asserts her capacity to understand the essence of what is at stake
in constitutional law. But to that audience Douglas preaches rather
than reasons-it is hard to see in what terms the opinion can imagine
its own refutation-and this is to establish an inherently authoritarian relation with the present and future reader. Harlan, by contrast to both, expresses a complex process of reasoning, each stage
of which exposes itself to potential refutation even as it seeks to
amend it. And the power of reasoning is not mere logic: it is an
attempt to think about the critical social issue in the terms established by our common past. If this were held out as a model of
conversation in the law, one could imagine turning to that life with
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a kind of eagerness, with a sense of pleasure and a hope of meaning,
that either of the other two opinions would blunt. It is true that
Harlan's discourse is one that requires training of the mind and
sensibility, and is in this sense not egalitarian. But its ultimate position is plainly enough stated for the average reader to follow; and
in the rest of it he offers an education in the art of mind he is
exercising, which is close to the center of what in a world like ours
we can mean by democracy.
Much as I admire the spirit in which Harlan does all this, I
should say that on the merits I myself am unconvinced that the line
he draws between the agent without a transmitter and the agent with
a transmitter is the important one. There is much to be said for
Justice White's view that not a great deal hangs on this. I agree
with much of Justice Harlan's sense of the meaning of the past but
think that it is the use of the informer himself (at least in any case
in which the initial contact is not criminal) that should count as a
search requiring judicial approval. 75 In this sense my view on the
"merits" is closest to that of Douglas, whose opinion is in my view
much less admirable than Harlan's. I say all this not because my
views on these matters have special importance, but to suggest by
this example one way in which one's estimate of the quality of an
opinion can differ from one's imagined vote.

75. For fuller explication of this position see White, "The Fourth Amendment as a Way of
Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock," 1974 Surp. CT. REv. 165, 227-231.

